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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




MUSE B., A minor, by his parent, Hanna B.
v.
UPPER DARBY SCHOOL DISTRICT; JOSEPH GALLI, 
Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent, 
Upper Darby School District; PATRICIA DENUCCI, 
Individually and in her official capacity as Coordinator of 
Elementary Special Education, Upper Darby School District,
*Hanna B., Appellant
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-00343)
District Judge:  Honorable Paul S. Diamond
                                                                        
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 19, 2008
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed:   June 27, 2008)
___________
OPINION
                      
      Because the parties are familiar with the complete factual and procedural background1
of this case, we will discuss it only to the extent necessary to our disposition.
      At that time, Muse B. was participating in the Autistic Support Program at Primos2
Elementary School.
      The IDEA was renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement3
Act, effective July 1, 2005.
2
PER CURIAM
Appellant Hanna B., the parent and natural guardian of Muse B., who has been
diagnosed with autism, presented an Administrative Due Process complaint against the
Upper Darby School District towards the end of the 2004-05 school year, and the hearing
officer found that Muse B. should be placed in his neighborhood school in regular
education classes with reading and math supports.   Muse B. was awarded compensatory1
education for each hour of school from February 18, 2005 through the last day of the
2004-05 school year.  The School District appealed the decision and won; a divided
administrative appeals panel decided that Muse B. should remain in the specialized
autistic program at his elementary school,  and the compensatory education award was2
reduced by half.
Hanna B. appealed that decision on January 25, 2006 in United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the School District and its
officials failed to provide Muse B. with a Free and Appropriate Public Education
(“FAPE”) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20
U.S.C. § 1401 et seq.   Violations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 293
3U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, also were
alleged.  Initially, Hanna B. was represented by an attorney from the Public Interest Law
Center of Philadelphia, but, because she was dissatisfied with this representation, the
District Court appointed Jeffrey Brydzinski, Esquire and Gregory Parks, Esquire to
represent her interests.  
Negotiations took place, and they resulted in a Consent Decree, which provided for
placing Muse B. in the regular third grade at his neighborhood school for the remainder
of the 2005-06 school year, with specialized services provided daily.  The parties also
agreed that the School District would evaluate and modify Muse B.’s Individualized
Education Program (“IEP”) to afford him a meaningful education, and it awarded 150
hours of compensatory education.  The claims against the School District and its officials
were to be dismissed with prejudice.  The District Court specifically found that the
Consent Decree had been negotiated in good faith (Consent Decree, at ¶ C), and the
parties were cautioned to read the entire stipulation before signing and agreeing to it. 
Hanna B. signed the Consent Decree, as did a representative of the School District, and
the Consent Decree was approved by the District Court and filed of record as an Order on
May 4, 2006.  The District Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Consent
Decree through the 2007-08 school year.  
Among other things, the Consent Decree provided for the retention by the School
District, at its expense, of an educational consultant with expertise in “inclusion and
4modification of the regular education curriculum” for a child with autism.  (Consent
Decree, at ¶ 3.)  If the parties could not agree on a consultant, the District Court would
make the final decision.  Shortly after the Consent Decree was signed and executed, the
parties ran into difficulties reaching an agreement on a consultant and the nature of the
consultant’s role.  Hanna B. wrote to the District Court, seeking to withdraw her consent
to the Consent Decree and seeking the withdrawal of her counsel.  The Magistrate Judge
to whom the case was referred held a conference on June 1, 2006 to discuss the request. 
Hanna B. was given the option of seeking different counsel, Supp. App. 61, but, in the
meantime, an agreement was reached to move ahead in implementing the Consent
Decree.  The dispute over the consultant and her role in assisting the School District,
Hanna B., and the IEP team in making Muse B.’s regular placement at his school work
for him and Hanna B. was resolved.  Supp. App. 62-63.  
The parties next had difficulty in the summer of 2006 in negotiating an IEP, and
Hanna B. asked the Magistrate Judge if she could proceed pro se, as she had during
administrative proceedings.  The Magistrate Judge held another conference on November
30, 2006, and explained the law in effect at the time that parents could not represent their
children in IDEA cases in federal court, see Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d
225, 231-37 (3d Cir. 1998) (non-attorney parents have no right to represent child under
IDEA as IDEA did not create joint rights in parents and child); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 17(c)
(minors precluded from pursuing their own legal actions).  Hanna B. expressed her
5dissatisfaction with the rule, Supp. App. 73, but, nevertheless, tried to clear up
communication with her counsel, and appeared to reaffirm her willingness to work under
the Consent Decree, Supp. App. 96-99.  
This agreement was short-lived.  By January 24, 2007, the Magistrate Judge was
recommending appointment of a guardian ad litem, and Hanna B.’s counsel were seeking
to withdraw.  After a hearing on the matter, the District Court, in an order entered on
February 14, 2007, granted the petition of counsel to withdraw from the case.  The court
made a finding that Hanna B., as a result of taking irrational and inconsistent positions in
her dealings with her attorneys, the School District, and even the court, was hurting her
son by making it impossible to implement the Consent Decree.  The court appointed
Marcie Marino-Romberger, Esquire, to serve as Muse B.’s guardian ad litem, and, in
doing so, reaffirmed the validity of the Consent Decree and determined that it should be
enforced.  The court limited Ms. Romberger’s role to handling matters relating to
implementing and enforcing the Consent Decree, and ordered Ms. Romberger to consult
with Hanna B. and keep her advised of all developments in the case.  
Hanna B. filed a timely notice of appeal pro se, seeking review of the February 14,
2007 order and challenging the validity of the Consent Decree.  In her brief on appeal, she
contends that she was coerced into signing the Consent Decree, and that it unfairly
benefitted the School District and resulted in an inadequate number of awarded hours of
compensatory education.  In addition, she contended that she has a right under the IDEA
      While this appeal was pending, the District Court ordered the School District to pay4
for the services of the guardian ad litem at a rate of $100.00 an hour up to a total of
$10,000.  We dispose of Hanna B.’s appeal of that decision, docketed at C.A. No. 07-
4111, in a separate Opinion.
6
to represent herself in litigation in the federal courts.4
We will affirm.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  As the issues
raised on appeal are purely legal, our review is plenary.  See Acands, Inc. v. Travelers
Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have carefully reviewed the briefs
and appendices, and considered the parties’ arguments, and conclude that the Consent
Decree was voluntarily and willingly entered into by Hanna B., and is therefore a binding
contract between the parties and should be enforced as written.  See D.R. by M.R. v. East
Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997).  Settlement agreements are
encouraged as a matter of public policy.  Id.  The Consent Decree was negotiated by
experienced counsel, was favorable to Hanna B. and her son insofar as it provided for
placing Muse B. in the regular third grade at his neighborhood school, with specialized
services provided daily.  Muse B.’s personal circumstances did not change during the
relevant time period, and thus enforcing the Consent Decree would not violate public
policy, id. at 901 & n.2.  We see no showing of duress on this record and there is no
indication that Hanna B. was threatened by either the School District or her counsel.  She
had full and complete input into the agreement.  The fact that she later judged the Consent
Decree to be inadequate does not render it invalid.  Id. at 901.  The Consent Decree is not
7void because she settled for less than she later believed the law provides. 
In addition, the District Court’s decision to appoint a guardian ad litem was proper
under the law in effect in this circuit at that time, Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231-37; Fed. R.
Civ. Pro. 17(c).  On May 21, 2007, while this case was pending on appeal, the Supreme
Court held in Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., --- U.S. ----, 127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007),
that, because parents have substantive rights under the IDEA which are not limited to
procedural and reimbursement-related matters, and which they may enforce by
prosecuting actions on their own behalf, the circuit court in that case erred when it
dismissed the parents’ appeal for lack of counsel.  The Supreme Court reasoned that the
IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for each child with a disability, see 20
U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d), with parents playing a significant role in this process.  Id.
at 2000 (citing Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005)).  Furthermore, “parents enjoy
enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.”  Id.
at 2002.  The Court expressly reserved the question whether the IDEA entitles parents to
litigate their child’s claims pro se.  Id. at 2007.
Accordingly, under Winkelman, Hanna B. may henceforth conduct litigation
matters pro se in federal court relating to her rights under the IDEA to challenge the
substantive adequacy of Muse B.’s FAPE.  In fact, she has done so in this appeal. 
However, we will not reverse that part of the District Court’s order appointing a guardian
8ad litem.  Hanna B. brought this case on behalf of Muse B. and not herself.  Tthis case, in
contrast to Winkelman, involves enforcement of a Consent Decree entered into before
Winkelman was decided and not a threshold action, and the District Court specifically
found that Hanna B. demonstrated an inability to work effectively with the School
District and the District Court in implementing a Consent Decree she voluntarily entered
into, and which provided significant benefits for her son.  Cf. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168, 184 (1984) (where Sixth Amendment rights attach, appointment of standby
counsel may be made even over objection of defendant “to relieve the judge of the need
to explain and enforce basic rules of courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in
overcoming routine obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement of his
own clearly indicated goals”).  Importantly, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in
Winkelman does not render Hanna B.’s stipulations and consent to the Consent Decree
unknowing and involuntary.  The Consent Decree was knowingly and voluntarily entered
into by Hanna B, and she did not seek to represent herself until after the Consent Decree
was approved by the District Court.  (Appellant’s Informal Brief, at 2.)
We will affirm all orders of the District Court entered in this case.  Appellant’s
motion for leave to file a supplemental appendix, which also is construed as a motion for
leave to expand the record, is granted.  Appellant’s motion to stay the District Court
proceedings, submitted in both appeals (Nos. 07-1739 & 07-4111), is denied. 
